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Questions Answered by The Budget Analyst
How does a CR affect hiring?
How does a CR affect contract awards?
What should we use the surplus for?
Why have recent Presidents and Congress
had such difficulties in reducing the Federal budget deficit?
What are the informal parts of the budget
process?
How do I find out about outsourcing?
What is franchising? What are
Fee-for-Service Operations? Working capital funds?
Why is Budgeting so
controversial and confrontational?
How does a CR affect hiring?
 | A continuing resolution (CR) has various effects on an agency and its ability and
willingness to hire people. Most CRs do not state anything about hiring. CRs affect hiring
indirectly. (Also, keep in mind that there are many management decisions that go
into stopping hiring, and sometimes CRs are blamed for things they should not be blamed
for.) |
| Directly, CRs do not allow new starts or increases in programs. If the position to be
filled is part of a new or expanded program that was in the budget request, then it may
not be filled under a CR. This is even true in the case in which Congress approved the
increase in the actions they many have taken on the appropriations bill. For example, the
bill may have been passed and sent to the President for signature with the increase, but
this does not count until the President actually signs. The conditions of the CR control
hiring until there is an enacted appropriation. |
| Indirectly, CRs limit actual hiring in that they mean that there is no normal
appropriation. This affects hiring in at least two ways. First, CRs are the result of
controversy and argument between the President and Congress. This creates uncertainty, and
makes it difficult for managers to make commitments to hiring - they may have to turn
around later and fire the people they just hired. Therefore, they stop hiring. (Generally,
this decision is made by the agency's top management, which imposes a hiring freeze.)
Another way in which hiring is affected is by the expectation that anything can happen
until all final appropriations are enacted. For example, at this time (October 1999) there
is talk about cutting all agencies to make the overall budget numbers match the caps. This
cut would affect even the agencies that have enacted appropriations, so even these
agencies may stop hiring until they are sure that they will not be affected by new cuts. |
| Agencies may have to wait (but don't have to wait) to fill vacancies until the final
bill is passed. This depends on the agency and is not necessarily related to the CR. If
the agency is involved in matters of life or death (such as fire fighting or law
enforcement) it usually would fill vacancies consistent with its budget levels.
Agencies could also fill vacancies if they are related to budget levels that are
consistent with its budget request and all the actions taken so far in Congress. For
example, if there is no cut in the budget, and there are vacancies that are below the
prior year's budget level, the agency should be able to fill its vacant positions.
Whether or not it does is really a management decision. |
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How does a CR affect contract awards?
| It depends on many things. For contracts to be awarded by September 30, 1999, there
should be no direct effect. Indirect effects could be related to the lack of funds early
in FY 2000 if the contract was awarded with only minimal FY 1999 funds and needs to be
funded each fiscal year. There are other similar circumstances that may present a problem.
If the contract is one for clearly defined deliverables, and it is funded fully, then
there would not be a problem. |
| For contracts to be awarded after September 30, 1999, it depends on the type of contract
and the source of funding. If the source of funds is a no year appropriation (such as that
usually used for construction), and the funds are available from FY 1999 or prior years,
there would be no direct effect related to a CR. If the funds are for two years, e.g.,
1999-2000, then there should be no effect either. In these examples the funds were
appropriated in prior years (but see last paragraph). |
| If the contract, however, is planned to be awarded using FY 2000 appropriations, then
the lack of a CR or an appropriation for the year would prevent the contract award. Even
if there is a CR it may prevent the award since there may not be enough money for the
award - for example, if the CR is for seven days, and the contract needs to be funded for
a full year, it is not likely that there would be enough money to make the award. There
could be other combinations, which I will not elaborate on. |
| More importantly, the lack or existence of a CR may affect the operations of contracts
shops. If the contracting people are furloughed, there will be no contracts awarded
regardless of the availability of money for the contract itself. If there is a CR and no
furlough, the contracts shops may process funded contracts. |
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What should we use the surplus for? (November
1999)
| What the surplus should be used for depends very much on your philosophy and what you
believe in. After all, a budget states what you will fund and, by omission, what you
will not fund. Choices have to be made since we do not have unlimited resources.
You have to take a stand after you familiarize yourself with the options.
There is no place that has the answer; all you will find are different opinions. (I
give some places to look for these opinions.) Disagreements about these choices are
at the heart of the current budget debate. You will have to decide for yourself what
the surplus should be used for. |
| In my view, you should consider the following options (I have also provided what I
would do. It is a the end of this answer.):
 | Some have suggested that the surplus be used for tax cuts, i.e., make the surplus go
away by lowering the amount of money the government gets from taxation. The Republicans
passed just such a measure, which the President vetoed. I have not looked into the
rationale for doing this (since I don't think that it was based on sound analysis), but I
am sure that there are a few web sites that present the Republican position on this. You
may try http://www.federalbudget.com,
which deals with the government debt; there are links there to other sites
that may be helpful. |
| Others have a long list of things that need to be funded, some of which the President
has been mentioning in the media. Obviously, one of the uses of the surplus is to fully
fund the President's budget requests. (You should check up on White House press releases
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/library/ThisWeek.cgi.) |
| For a distinctly different view on budget matters, you should go to the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (http://www.cbpp.org), a think
tank that is a good balance to the Republican posturing on the surplus. |
| A couple of additional sources that may be helpful: The Washington Post carries a series
of articles on budget issues. Government Executive Magazine also has good coverage,
including columns by Stan Collender. (Links at Developments and
the Process page.) |
|
| I would use the "surplus" mostly to pay down the debt, which is what Clinton
originally proposed (I believe he proposed using 62% of the "surplus" for this).
This would help the overall economy, and make it possible to deal with the social security
problems of the next century. Some of it I would use to deal with underfunding of current
programs that would also affect all citizens in the next century: Defense could use some
more (we should not be scared from acting boldly where needed because we do not have
enough ammunition), as could things such as school modernization and national park system
enhancements. |
| In all this we have to keep in mind that the "surplus" could disappear in a
few months. It all depends on the economy, and this cannot be controlled by the
government. Any time that some forecasted amount of future government income is used
to make permanent changes in government expenses (either through programs or tax
reduction) I get nervous. Usually the expense becomes permanent and the income does
not materialize. This is my rationale for what I would do. None of what I
would do would be permanent, such as a tax cut would be. If the "surplus"
does not happen, debt reduction would stop or slow, but this is not the same as the debt
increasing because of new spending. The smaller spending I would propose could be
reduced from one year to the next without major damage. |
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Why have recent Presidents and Congress had such difficulties
in reducing the Federal budget deficit? (August 2000)
I received this question from a student in of American Government in the U.K. I
answered:
I have a link on my site to the Washington Post's budget deficit (now surplus)
page. There is a short explanation there.
By and large, the problems in trying to reduce the deficit have been the perennial
human propensity to want to spend and pay later. Americans love their government and its
services but they hate the taxes that it takes to pay for them. And politicians get
elected when they do what the electorate wants - spend and not tax!
American politics is not geared very well to act in the absence of an evident crisis.
This has its benefits, but it does not make for economic rationality. The deficit kept
getting larger and larger every year, so large that it could not be addressed by mere
politicians. But the annual amounts did not seem to be all that bad, and curbing them
would have taken budget cuts (unpalatable) and increasing taxes (also unpalatable).
Without Presidential leadership, the problem was not going to be addressed. And presidents
until Bush did not really care about the deficit, or could not act on it. Congress does
not mind taking action, but it wants the President to make them do so - it makes for good
electoral politics.
Congress and the President always try to find a way to shield themselves from
unpalatable actions; doing this takes time. Commissions are used to do this, and
commissions take years to study a problem, recommend actions, and then Congress takes its
own time to take action. A commission was at the heart of the solution for the deficit
problem.
The problem started to surface under the Johnson Administration, which decided not to
raise taxes to pay for the Vietnam War, and the Nixon Administration, which increased
social benefits. Congress also played a role in all this, as well as increasing social
security benefits without increasing taxes. But the root cause of the recent problem was
created by the Reagan Administration which greatly reduced taxes and increased
expenditures, mostly for a defense buildup - the deficit was as high as 6.1% of GDP in
1983. This deficit of the Reagan years was compounded by poor economic performance.
It is, however, too easy to state that no actions were being taken to control the
problem. As early as the Carter administration (1977-1981) the social security problem was
being addressed, by a commission that reported in 1981 (under Reagan). This led to an
increase in social security taxes soon thereafter - keep in mind that most of the current
and projected surplus is due to these taxes. And there was a major reversal of the Reagan
tax cuts in 1986 while Reagan was still President. And George Bush (the President, the
father of the current Republican candidate) had to eat his words about taxes - he agreed
to another increase, as well as budget cuts. And Clinton also agreed to budget cuts and
tax increases. And what has saved the situation is the economic performance of the
country, which is probably beyond political control on the upside (politicians can ruin
it, but they cannot make it happen).
Hope this throws some light on the problem you are addressing. If you want to do more
research, I suggest that you explore the links I have on my page for links on developments
in the process, http://www.budgetanalyst.com/links1.htm. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities has interesting views on budget matters. You should also take a look at what
the Congressional Budget Office has to offer, www.cbo.gov; CBO prepares reports on the
deficit and surplus, and they provide a dispassionate view of the whole situation.
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What are the informal parts of the budget process? (November 1999)
| I assume that "informal" processes would be those not required by the
procedures that are documented, such as the laws, regulations, and OMB and other
directives related to budget preparation and processing through Congress. These
informal aspects generally involve discussions, phone calls, and sometimes meetings, so
they are hard to document or even to know about. But I will give you some leads as to
where you can find out more. |
| In my display of the budget process I indicate in many cases what the agency has to do,
such as appealing the OMB passback and working the system to make its case. You may want
to look at the steps of the process with this aspect in mind. In
all agencies the head of the agency consults with trusted advisors as to what to put in
the budget request to OMB, and there is also consultation with various people at OMB and
the White House as to what may be possible or desirable. In some cases there is no
request from the agency because there is an understanding that funding for some things
will be added later as part of the final packaging of the President's budget request.
These consultations are all informal. |
| After the budget request is submitted to OMB, OMB analysts have questions about the
request, usually challenging the agency's position. These interchanges can involve notes,
phone calls, or meetings. At the same time, the agency head may be lobbying people
in the White House and OMB (at the political appointee level) to make the case for the
agency. Once there is a passback from OMB, the agency head has to decide whether to
accept the passback, or attempt to have it overturned either within OMB or the White
House. Sometimes these appeals are carried to the President himself. (You could
argue that the passback process itself is an informal process. In many cases what happens
is not even documented.) |
| Once the request is sent to Congress, there are also interactions between the agency,
OMB, White House staff, and the appropriations committees and its staffs. These involve
various means, including notes, faxes, phone calls, meetings. You can read about
this process in the press - go to the Washington Post site (links)
and read the articles that deal with the budget and the current negotiations [Note: This is written in November 1999] on the appropriations acts
that have not been passed. The Post reports in great detail what is going on. All of
it is informal. These informal discussions determine what the final budget will be,
and then are translated into final formal actions, such as votes and enacted legislation.
As part of these interactions commitments of various sorts are made and all are
expected to abide by these commitments even if they are not written down. |
| Another example of informality could be the "earmarks" in appropriations
reports. They are not in the statute itself, but are treated as if they were even in
the face of legal opinions that they are not binding. Although instructions to the
agency in the report is viewed as an informal directive, in practice they are as binding
as if they were written into a law. |
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How do I find out about outsourcing?
| There is no one place in the Federal budget for finding information on
outsourcing. Few Presidents would want to emphasize this aspect of their policies as
they do other things, so special analyses are not made part of the budget documents.
Outsourcing, or contracting out, funds are usually listed under contracts for the
various agencies and categories in the budget, so you have to look at each agency.
An increase in contracts while staffing stagnates or decreases would be an indicator of
increased outsourcing. |
| A complication is that not all contracts are "outsourcing" since many of them
are for work that is not done by the Federal government itself - at least not in recent
years. The reason for not having a discrete identification of outsourcing is that no
agency wants to predict what it will no longer do itself because doing so may cause many
problems with the potentially affected employees. |
| Source documents would be the Appendix to the Budget of the United States, the analyses
provided by OMB, and the National Performance Review plans. For the defense
establishment there are many policy statements related to the fact that DOD expects to
reduce costs by increasing outsourcing. For example, DOD outsourcing of infrastructure and
support activities is expected to save $6.4 billion over five years, and that there will
be two more rounds of base closures and realignments, in 2001 and 2005. (Source: Budget of
the U.S., FY 1999.) There are other statements related to these policies on the web - see http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/di1130.html,
speech on outsourcing policies, and http://www.defenselink.mil/ and http://www.hhgfaa.org/portal/feb_98/feb40.asp
for additional examples. DOD apparently expects to make great savings in its $90+ billion
annual procurement budget by outsourcing more and better. |
| The GSA budget also includes a statement from FEDSIM that it "provides data
processing outsourcing services to Federal agencies, offering a quick, low-cost
alternative for obtaining commercial data processing services." (Information
Technology Fund, account 47-4548-0-4-804 in the Appendix.) FEDSIM provides
contractor services to Federal agencies for information technology (computers, etc.)
support via interagency agreements. FEDSIM gets its money from other agencies, so knowing
what FEDSIM is budgeting is not directly helpful. The FEDSIM budget reflects what FEDSIM
already knows other agencies will give it or what it guesses it will get, not what GSA is
directly budgeting for this purpose. |
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What is franchising? What are Fee-for-Service
Operations? Working Capital Funds?
During the summer of 1999, I received a question about information on "fee
for service" organizations and the prospects for franchising in the Federal
government. Here is my resonse:
| I will attempt to get you an answer, although it may take a bit to get there. There is
much sloppiness in terminology, generally because there are many different things going
on, started at different times, and much of what happens related to "fee for
services" is not called that at all; it is generally related to outsourcing.
(Although I think that you may already have looked at the "REPORT TO CONGRESS: The
Franchise Fund Pilot Program, An Interim Progress Report," at Financenet, you may
want to look at its introductory sections again. Although I do not share the rosy
expectations expressed, there is a good summary of why the six franchise funds were set
up, i.e., to overcome the problems related to many disparate legal basis for funds.) So
there is no simple answer. I hope you can bear with me. |
| The Federal government has been doing much to try to be a business, at least since the
Nixon Administration, and various agencies have tried many things. A large scale push in
this direction was started during the Reagan Administration. Many national laboratories
became semi-private operations, taking on work for private parties. The Defense
establishment has been following the same path. Even Defense test facilities are offering
their services. All this is authorized by many statutes. (For example, Defense’s work
is encouraged by Public Law 103-160, the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act, Section 846,
amended Title 10, U.S. Code, to add Section 2681, "Use of Test and Evaluation
installations by commercial entities". This section permits the Department of Defense
to contract with commercial users to perform test services at test ranges.) All of these
operations are involved in one way or another in activities related to working capital
funds and "fee for services." |
| You’d like "a clear, up-to-date explanation, preferably in layperson's terms,
of working capital funds and franchise funds and how they are used by federal agencies
operating fee-for-service organizations." This is an easy one, since there is no
difference between them, other than political. A working capital fund (WCF) is used to
collect costs for activities that are best funded, or more easily funded, by means other
than through direct appropriations. A WCF is simply another type of account that shows up
in the Federal listing of accounts for each agency, in the Appendix to the Budget. For
example, EPA’s franchise fund pilot is officially called the "Working Capital
Fund," and the original appropriations language stated that "there is hereby
established in a Treasury a franchise pilot fund to be known as the ‘Working Capital
Fund,’ as authorized by section 403 of [GMRA]" i.e., a franchise fund is a
working capital fund, and a working capital fund can be a franchise fund if it is one of
the six pilots. The problem is usually the legal authority for the funds, which are
authorized by many statutes. Unless there is a clear statutory authority, they cannot be
set up. |
| OMB is the ultimate source of all definitions related to financial and budgetary
matters, and there is nothing in OMB’s guidance to agencies for budget preparation or
execution that deals with franchise funds. (This guidance is in Circulars A-11 and A-34,
with A-11 issued every year, most recently July 1999, and A-34 periodically, most recently
1997.) OMB’s definitions deal with "revolving funds," defined as funds
which conduct a regular cycle of business-like activity and charge for the sale of
products or services. Revolving funds can be either intragovernmental (which conduct
business mainly within and between government agencies) or public enterprise (which
conduct business mainly with the public). In my example, EPA’s working capital fund
is an intragovernmental fund. |
| Franchise funds are best understood in the context of the National Performance Review
and its attempts to move government work to the private sector. At the time when material
related to franchises was at the NPR web site there was much PR about the need to set up
franchises, and about the need for Federal executives to get with the program and to
operate like businesses. My interpretation is that a franchise was to be a way to set up a
business unit that then could be spun off as a non-Federal entity. (Just such an event is
highlighted at the NPR site now [August 1999].) |
| You would also like to know the advantages and disadvantages of each type of funding.
Since there is no difference between a reimbursable arrangement and a fee for service one,
or a working capital fund and a franchise operation, the comparison would have to be
between these arrangements and normal operations with direct appropriations. The
advantages of a working capital fund arrangement are basically two: (1) From the fund and
its managers’ perspective, the fund can charge for capital expenditures that may
occur every few years through its annual charges, essentially converting annual or
biannual appropriations (which are the source of its "income") into no year
funds, and can accumulate these funds until needed (funding for capital expenses is hard
to achieve through regular appropriations because they are usually counted against the
year in which appropriated), and (2) from the user of services perspective, it provides a
way to control and influence services that are usually provided by unresponsive
centralized organizations. |
| You also ask about the differences between cost reimbursable and fee for service.
"Fee for service" does not exist in the Federal financial community in the same
way as reimbursable costs exists. While OMB has exhaustively defined
"reimbursable" costs (in Circulars A-11 and A-34), OMB clearly states that
"user fees" are not a separate category, but a part of reimbursables. So the fee
for service term is a subset of the reimbursable category, and is used to define the fact
that there is a charge imposed on the user before a service is rendered. In common talk, a
"fee" is when you charge someone for the service, such as the fee charged by the
National Park Service for admission to a national park (OMB defines this one as an
"offsetting receipt"). The terminology is best understood if you think of a fee
as something charged the public (in which case it would be done by a public enterprise
fund) and a reimbursement comes from another Federal agency (as part of the transactions
of an intergovernmental revolving fund). After all, a fee is charged to recover costs, and
reimbursements also recover costs. There is no real difference other than common
perceptions. Fees usually come in many small amounts while "reimbursables" are
generally associated with annual payments involving large sums. |
| You are also interested in the relationship between GMRA and the Economy Act. GMRA
simply authorized six pilot programs to demonstrate how you would do franchises, and
required a report to Congress. The Economy Act requires that Federal agencies use the
cheapest source of services within the Federal establishment before they set up their own
competitive operations and that they recover, to the extent that they provide a service or
benefit to a subset of the population, the Federal government’s costs for providing
the service. (One way to look at it is that GMRA provides political cover for six specific
implementations of what otherwise could have been done under the Economy Act, and in fact
most of the "pilots" under GMRA were in existence prior to GMRA.) The Economy
Act is almost half a century old, and OMB has steadily pushed agencies to charge
"fees" to the public for whatever "service" a fee could be justified.
The use of other Federal agencies that can do better for less is achieved through
interagency agreements that involve reimbursable authority, a process also mediated by
OMB. To use another EPA example, manufacturers of motor vehicles must pay EPA a fee
for the certification of their vehicles prior to introduction into interstate commerce.
(EPA collects about $10 million every year through these fees.) A part of this fee is
directly authorized by the Clean Air Act, but an element of the fee covers EPA’s
costs related to generating the fuel economy labels required for each car sold in the
United States. This fuel economy label fee is collected under the authority of the Economy
Act. The Economy Act principle being followed here is that a discrete sector of the
public, the manufacturer, derives a benefit (i.e., is allowed to sell vehicles) and that
this benefit costs the government, so the manufacturer is to reimburse the government for
the expenses involved. |
| You are also interested in the accounting for costs. This an interesting area, which
ultimately boils down to accounting systems, accounting rules and definitions, and OMB
guidance. By and large, the Federal government very accurately accounts for its use of
funds, and eventually you can find out where every penny goes and where it came from. What
is loose is the definition of how you label what you use, and this involves policy,
political, and practical judgments. For funds that simply are set up to collect money,
such as the EPA motor vehicle fees, almost any accounting method will work since they are
not really set up to recover the precise full costs of the operation, and there is no real
check or balance. At the other end of the spectrum, where organizations are actually spun
off to the private sector, accurate accounting for all costs is essential or otherwise a
major failure could take place. Federal workers and managers are smart enough to figure
out what the consequences are, and act accordingly, i.e., they will carefully account for
costs where it matters, and will not where it does not matter. In these cases it matters
little how you account for overhead costs or retirement liabilities because they either do
not matter, or you do a very detailed analysis of what your costs will be based on your
staffing. (No one really worries about OPM’s retirement or health benefits costs 50
years later. These costs are always charged to its own account, and the spun off
enterprise does not have to account for it. But see below.) |
| Working capital funds set up to run centralized functions which will forever remain
governmental, on the other hand, fall in between. There is no real consequence related to
failing to fully account for costs because someone will eventually have to bail out the
enterprise; after all, it is still socialism, and the enterprise will not go bankrupt. The
managers involved may not have a pleasant time of it, but the fund will not close down.
Something will be done, such as increase the charges. Additionally, if the fund is not
charged for OPM’s retirement costs, there is no need to worry about them; whether or
not such charges are appropriate is determined up front and usually by OMB. |
| For cases where the actual overhead costs may make a difference (and this in many cases
does not involve revolving funds), OMB provides guidance. Circular A-76 and its annual
transmittals provide very specific numbers to be used in making the computations for
comparing contracted and in house services, down to a tenth of a percentage point. A-76 is
generally associated with outsourcing or contracting out Federal work, but it can also be
used to fully account for all costs of an enterprise if any one cared to do so. But
revolving funds do not account for their charges in this way because they are not required
to do so. The retirement related costs of their past, present, and future employees are
carried in other accounts, and apart from special exercises of mostly academic interest
there is no "full costing" of most things in the Federal establishment. (Neither
is there such a thing in the private sector. If you don’t believe me, look at social
security costing by firms. They do not take into account for current operations the future
increased costs of social security for which they will be charged, although these are
quite well understood.) The bottom line on this is that there is very little incentive to
fully account for all costs outside the areas where it is required by A-76. So the
answer to your last question is that no one accounts for the retirement costs because they
are funded from a separate account separately appropriated, so there is no organization
that has fully accounted for all costs. |
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What follows is a response I gave to a person who worked in the
Defense establishment and was attempting to get some perspective on why things were not
working logically and efficiently. My answer:
I am not familiar enough with DOD operations to give you information
that specifically targets DOD budget processes and other management processes, but they
probably are very similar to those of many other organizations, as are the problems. DOD
happens to be larger, so things get magnified. You probably would have no problem
documenting some of the problems with what you have experienced. What follows is some
information that may help you put this in a broader perspective.
You should review Chapter 2 of the Handbook of Government Budgeting,
Joey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1999, Roy T. Meyers, ed. (pp. 31-52).
"Understanding the Role of Conflict in Budgeting" is what this chapter, by Irene
S. Rubin, is all about. It explains why conflict is endemic in budgeting. And, in my
opinion, conflict does lead to strange results. (The Handbook is listed in references. I strongly recommend it to those involved in
budget analysis.)
It also seems to me that you are looking at "governmental
disfunctionality" as perceived by politicians and the public, as well as many
attempting to get useful work done inside these systems. Systems are in place for a
different place and time and job, and politicians and others insist in keeping them this
way, and changing them at the same time - clearly a prescription for insanity. These
problems come "front and center" in the budget process: The budget has to add
up. It is hard to fudge in the budget process, especially within an agency (there is no
such thing as agency deficit funding beyond a few years - postponed maintenance and other
such tricks cannot be done for long); no agency can issue bonds that allow it to postpone
hard decisions. When there are contradictory and mutually exclusive policies that must be
implemented, in the budget process it is difficult to continue to pretend that they are
not mutually exclusive.
I recommend you look at the works of Paul Light. One of his more recent
works is cited at Brookings' site at
http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/light/199901GOVEXEC.htm. Another one of his pieces is
at http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/light/19990311.htm. Light addresses questions related
to why things are the way they are, and provides insights as to the why. (Generally, his
writings are depressing.) The Brookings site has many other sources that may be useful for
your work, as well as links to others. You may also want to look at Dick Armey's (House
majority leader) site on government management (http://freedom.house.gov/results/). There
are many links at this page, including "Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks" which leads to GAO's studies of problems with program implementation. Although
Armey clearly has an agenda, the views expressed at the site and the links provide useful
perspectives as to how the majority in Congress views government management. The site does
not go to root causes (they would need a mirror for that), but it should give plenty of
food for thought.
Also at the Brookings site, you should look at the list of works in
progress (http://www.brook.edu/gs/gs_projall.htm#gridlock). The topics the authors deal
with may lead you to their past work which may be of relevance to your study. For example
(as extracted from the site) work in progress includes:
Omnibus Legislation: Lawmaking in an Age of
Political Fragmentation by Allen Schick. The author looks at the implications of omnibus
measures for the distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches and
within Congress.
Circumventing Gridlock by Sarah Binder. This
study examines the causes, consequences, and possible institutional solutions to
legislative gridlock — explaining changes in the level of legislative productivity
over time and exploring why some policy issues are conducive to legislative solutions
while others tend towards political stalemate.
What you see within DOD is simply a reflection of the events unfolding
in parts of the government that control and affect DOD (i.e., Congress and the President,
and the country at large) as well as the playing out of these forces within DOD itself -
not all DOD rules are harmonized instantaneously to make them all compatible! Of course,
the key question is, if all these smart people know that there is a problem, why is there
a problem? The answer is usually the same - to paraphrase Churchill: Because this system
is the worst except for all the others.
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